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ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
TODAY
Spencer Weber Waller*
In 1958, the late Kingman Brewster published a remarkable book
entitled Antitrust and American Business Abroad.' In that book,
then Harvard Law School Professor Brewster argued that it was not
in the United States's overall economic, diplomatic, or foreign policy
interests to apply the Sherman and Clayton Acts to international
and foreign business activities to the full extent arguably permitted
by the language of the antitrust laws and the Constitution.2 In ana-
lyzing both the legal doctrine and policy issues, Brewster formulated
a series of proposed reforms, including most prominently the adop-
tion of a so-called "jurisdictional rule of reason" to govern when the
United States should exercise jurisdiction over a case involving an-
ticompetitive conduct taking place outside the territory of the
United States.3
Since its publication, Antitrust and American Business Abroad
has influenced two full generations of scholars, practitioners, and
judges in thinking about the application of United States antitrust
law to the conduct of business in international markets.4 In this Ar-
ticle, I suggest that the impact of Antitrust and American Business
Abroad was a product of how well it responded to the business and
legal environment in which it appeared and how it, in turn, helped
change that environment.5 Now, nearly forty years later, I wish to
further suggest how the concerns in international antitrust law and
enforcement policy have changed and outline the new antitrust chal-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. University of Michigan, J.D. Northwestern
University School of Law. Special thanks to Professors Leo Raskind, Andrew Gavil and Anthony
Sebok for their comments on prior drafts of this manuscript and to Gregory Tesoro for his re-
search assistance.
1. KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958).
2. Id. at 442-58.
3. Id. at 301-06, 362-71, 446-48.
4. See infra notes 119-43 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Brewster's book on
caselaw and legislative developments).
5. See infra notes 38-87 and accompanying text (discussing the domestic and international cli-
mates at the time Brewster's piece was published).
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lenges and opportunities for American businesses operating in inter-
national markets.8
I. THE SETTING FOR ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD
Antitrust and American Business Abroad was a ground-breaking
work because of its author, subject matter, methodology, and tim-
ing. Each factor contributed to the book's lasting influence.
A. The Author
Kingman Brewster was a figure of national and international dis-
tinction with a record of outstanding public service, of which his
legal scholarship was but a small part." Oddly enough, Brewster be-
gan as a bit of an isolationist, leading the Yale University chapter of
"America First" while an undergraduate.8 These views were quick
to change. Upon graduation in 1941, he worked in Washington,
D.C., for the office of Inter-American Affairs, under the direction of
Nelson Rockefeller." In 1942, Brewster joined the Navy and served
as an aviator on antisubmarine patrols in the Atlantic Ocean until
the end of World War II.10
Following graduation from Harvard Law School, he worked in
Paris as an assistant to the special representative of the Marshall
Plan." After a short stint on the faculty of MIT, Brewster joined
the Harvard Law School faculty in 1950.12 Three years later he was
made a full professor at the age of thirty-four, specializing in anti-
trust and international economic law.' 3
In 1960, Brewster left Harvard Law School to become provost of
Yale University. 4 Following the death of then Yale President A.
6. See infra notes 144-225 and accompanying text (discussing significant recent changes in
international antitrust concerns).
7. For the biographical details of Kingman Brewster's life, see N.B.A. Notes, CHIc. TRIB.,
Nov. 10, 1988, § 4, at 5; Kingman Brewster, ex-ambassador to Britain and Yale president, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1988, at 69; Eric Pace, Kingman Brewster Jr., 69, Ex-Yale President and
U.S. Envoy, Dies. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1988, at D29; Bart Barnes, Ex-President of Yale, Kingman
Brewster Dies, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1988, at C8.
8. Kingman Brewster, Ex-Ambassador to Britain and Yale President, supra note 7, at 69.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Pace, supra note 7, at D29.
13. Id.
14. Kingman Brewster, Ex-Ambassador to Britain and Yale President, supra note 7, at 69.
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Whitney Griswold in 1963, Brewster became acting president and
within a matter of months was offered the job on a permanent
basis.1
Brewster's tenure as President of Yale from 1963 to 1977 brought
him to national prominence.16 He received both praise and criticism
for his decisions expanding minority recruitment, cutting back on
the admission of the sons of alumni, and, in 1969, admitting women
students for the first time in the two hundred sixty-eight year his-
tory of Yale. 17
These controversial decisions were a mere prelude to a series of
decisions that brought Brewster into direct public conflict with the
Nixon Administration. Brewster was an outspoken opponent of the
Vietnam War and once led a Yale antiwar demonstration in Wash-
ington, D.C.18 This activism combined with his statements doubting
that black radicals in America could get a fair trial19 and his deci-
sion to open Yale facilities to more than ten thousand demonstrators
protesting the recent murder trial of Black Panther leaders20 may
have saved Yale from much of the strife that engulfed U.S. colleges
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It also earned him a place on the
"enemies" list of the President of the United States, and he received
the public wrath of Vice President Agnew, who had called for his
resignation.2' On the lighter side, these same decisions earned him a
place for years as the liberal and erudite "President King" in the
Doonesbury comic strip by the creator, Gary Trudeau, who was a
Yale student during this era. 2
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter appointed Brewster as the
United States Ambassador to Great Britain.2 8 He served with great
popularity among the British until 1981, when he returned to the
United States to practice law.2 4 He continued to make his mark on
a diverse set of legal issues, including serving as a special master on
15. Id.
16. Barnes, supra note 7, at C8.
17. Pace, supra note 7, at D29.
18. Kingman Brewster, Ex-Ambassador to Britain and Yale President, supra note 7, at 69.
19. Id.
20. Id. (indicating that black activists Bobby Seale and other Black Panther leaders were being
tried for the slaying of Alex Rackley).
21. Id.
22. Pace, supra note 7, at D29.
23. Kingman Brewster, Ex-Ambassador to Britain and Yale President, supra note 7, at 69.
24. Pace, supra note 7, at D29.
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free agency disputes in the National Basketball Association.2 5 In
1986, Brewster returned to England once more, this time to serve as
the master of University College, Oxford University, which was a
most unusual position for an American citizen, and he continued in
that position until his death at the age of sixty-nine in 1988.26
B. Brewster's Legal Scholarship
Antitrust and American Business Abroad was the crowning, but
by no means the only, academic achievement for Kingman Brew-
ster. Not surprisingly, the bulk of Brewster's scholarship came dur-
ing his service as a member of the Harvard Law School faculty. 7
Prior to Antitrust and American Business Abroad, Brewster had
published two articles28 and a number of shorter pieces for the
Harvard Law School Bulletin."
Antitrust and American Business Abroad was published in 1958,
when Brewster was thirty-nine years old.30 Shortly thereafter, Brew-
ster published a casebook on international business transactions with
Milton Katz, Brewster's Harvard Law School faculty colleague, as
well as mentor and boss during Brewster's post-war work in Paris on
the Marshall Plan.31 Although his subsequent administrative and
diplomatic positions made substantial formal scholarship difficult,
Brewster continued as a speaker and writer on antitrust, interna-
25. N.B.A. Notes, supra note 7, at 5.
26. Kingman Brewster, Ex-Ambassador to Britain and Yale President, supra note 7, at 69;
Pace, supra note 7, at D29.
27. Brewster served on the Harvard Law School Faculty from 1950 until 1960. See Pace, supra
note 7, at D29.
28. Kingman Brewster, Jr., Restraint of Trade with Foreign Nations: The Relevance of Busi-
ness Purpose, 13 Bus. LAW. 792 (1958) (questioning whether the definition of "restraint of trade"
is different for foreign commerce than its definition for domestic commerce); Kingman Brewster,
Jr., Legal Aspects of the Foreignness of Foreign Investment, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 267 (1956) (seek-
ing answers to problems that lawyers face today in the private, public and promitive sectors which
may faciliate international legal relations in the future).
29. Kingman Brewster, Jr., Antitrust at Harvard, 7 HARV. L. S. BULL. 6 (1956); Kingman
Brewster, Jr., Course in Legal Problems in Doing Business Abroad, 6 HARV. L. S. BULL. 3
(1955); Kingman Brewster, Jr., Harvard Law in Salzburg, 4 HARV. L. S. BULL. 9 (1953).
30. KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958).
31. MILTON KATZ & KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
AND RELATIONS (1960). The casebook contained a fifty-five page treatment of overlapping and
conflicting regulation of restrictive and monopolistic practices as well as proposals for interna-
tional action in the competition law area. Id. at 549-604. This appears to have been one of the first
comprehensive treatments of its kind in contemporary casebooks along with an even lengthier
treatment in the second edition of Chester Oppenheim's 1959 antitrust casebook. See S. CHESTER-
FIELD OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS CASES AND COMMENTS 913-1027 (2d ed. 1959).
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tional law, and other legal issues well into the 1980s."
C. The Antitrust Environment in 1958
Brewster studied antitrust and entered academia to teach and
write about the field in an era very different from our own. It was
an era when antitrust had only recently reorganized itself as a sepa-
rate field of specialists and moved away from being part of a
broader general category of trade regulation or corporate law. Pro-
fessor Milton Handler had published the first modern antitrust
casebook in 1937. 3 In 1958, students and professors of antitrust
largely had a choice between the 1948 edition of Professor Chester-
field Oppenheim's Cases on Federal Anti-Trust Laws 4 or the sec-
ond edition of Professor Handler's casebook published in 1951.31
While there were a number of fine articles, handbooks, and treatises
on antitrust, there was nothing like the explosion of casebooks, horn-
books, treatises, monographs, guidelines, and other descriptive and
analytical literature that is available today from the government,"
the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, 7 academic
32. See, e.g., Kingman Brewster, Does the Constitution Care About Coercive Federal Fund-
ing?, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1983) (discussing the use of eligibility for federal funding as a
regulatory device); Kingman Brewster, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A. - A Review, 36 REC. OF
THE ASS'N OF THE B. OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 408 (1981) (book review) (reviewing A.D. NEALE &
D.G. GOYDES, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (3d ed. 1980)); King-
man Brewster, Jr., Preface: International Law and American Legal Practice, 53 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 709, 711 (1978) (discussing the "pervasive importance of international awareness in the
thought of legal scholars and the work of legal practitioners").
33. MILTON HANDLER, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (1937); see
also JAMES ANGELL MCLAUGHLIN, CASES ON THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1933).
34. S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS INCLUDING RE-
STRAINTS OF TRADE AT COMMON LAW (1948). Oppenheim did not publish a second edition of his
casebook until 1959.
35. MILTON HANDLER, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (2d ed. 1951);
see also FRANK ELKOURI, TRADE REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS (1957). Professor
Elkouri's casebook is shorter and much more of a survey in comparison to either the Handler or
Oppenheim work and has no separate chapter on the application of antitrust to the foreign com-
merce of the United States.
36. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice now publishes and disseminates in
hard copy and electronic form a variety of guidelines, speeches, press releases, economic studies,
and business review letters in addition to the wide availability of briefs and other papers filed in
the course of litigation. The Federal Trade Commission publishes and disseminates similar materi-
als in addition to the publications of the decisions of the Commission.
37. The Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association is probably the largest publisher of
legal materials pertaining to antitrust in the world. Its publications include ANTITRUST LAW DE-
VELOPMENTS (3d ed. 1992) and its annual updates, the Antitrust Law Journal, a series of now 20
monographs, a series of practice handbooks, and a variety of continuing legal education materials
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presses, commercial and publishers, professionally edited journals,
and student-run law reviews. Brewster's contributions thus must be
understood in light of the state of general antitrust law and policy
and the special concerns involving foreign commerce during that
period.
1. The Domestic Agenda
Brewster wrote Antitrust and American Business Abroad in a
time of almost unlimited antitrust expansion which found support in
both the case law and the structural consensus in then contemporary
industrial organization economic theory.3 8 From the end of the
Great Depression8" well into the 1960s, the Supreme Court when it
addressed antitrust issues, expanded liability, and preserved or cre-
ated per se rules which rendered categories of agreements or behav-
ior illegal on their face.40 Much of this trend began with Justice
Douglas's opinion in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.4' and
its famous footnote 59, formulating the strictest possible per se con-
demnation of agreements between competitors affecting the pricing
mechanism. 42 In the decade preceding the appearance of Antitrust
and American Business Abroad, the Supreme Court added or af-
firmed per se rules or their functional equivalents condemning ex-
in connection with programs conducted worldwide.
38. For representative views both praising and criticizing the antitrust landscape of this era, see
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK (1958); SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUN-
DATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1958 INSTITUTE ON ANTITRUST LAWS (1958); JOE S. BAIN, BARRI-
ERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); G.E. HALE & ROSEMARY HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND
SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT (1958); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959). Scholars in this area also extensively
probed the analyses of the legislative history of the Sherman Act and the purposes underlying the
United States antitrust laws. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955). The
author "attempts to push the frontiers of research concerning the federal antitrust policy of the
United States" by examining the social science interpretation of the policy's origination and the
institutionalization period of the policy. Id. at vi.
39. The prior ambivalence of the United States executive branch and the judiciary towards the
value of antitrust is set forth in Appalachian Coals v. United States. 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (holding
that a coal company combination was not per se unlawful under the Sherman Act). For a discus-
sion of the conflicting policies and programs in the New Deal's antitrust decisions, see ELLIS W.
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).
40. See infra notes 43-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's tendency to find liabil-
ity in antitrust cases during this period).
41. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
42. Id. at 225-26 n.59 ("Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements
may be thought to have, the law does not permit on inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all
banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy.").
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clusive dealing contracts,4" minimum and maximum resale price
maintenance not protected by state law,44 refusals to deal,45 and
tying.46
In the merger area, the Department of Justice waited until 1955
to bring its first test cases under the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amend-
ment strengthening Section 7 of the Clayton Act.47 The Supreme
Court would not definitively interpret those 1950 amendments until
the next decade in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.48 However, the
Justice Department had used the Clayton Act successfully to reach
back decades and to invalidate a partial vertical integration of Gen-
43. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (using § 3 of the Clayton
Act). "It cannot be gainsaid that observance by a dealer of his requirements contract . . . effec-
tively foreclose[s] whatever opportunity there might be for competing suppliers to attract his-
patronage ... ." Id.
44. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (holding that
Seagram's refusal to sell to a wholesale liquor business because that business did not agree to
Seagram's maximum resale price was per se illegal). Maximum price fixing along with minimum
price fixing were held per se illegal because they restrain the trader's freedom to set his own prices
according to his own judgment. Id.
45. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (holding that a refusal to deal
violates §2 of the Sherman Act). In this case, Lorain Journal attempted to prevent a radio station
from cutting into the journal's substantial monopoly on news and advertisement distributions by
refusing to print any customer's advertisement who also dealt with the radio station. Id. at 150-51;
see also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (holding that
"[g]roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders," are prohibited).
46. A tying agreement is one in which the seller agrees to sell a product to a buyer only on the
condition that the buyer purchases a different (or "tied") product as well. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The case held that tying agreements are per se unreasona-
ble when the seller has sufficient market power to restrain trade of the "tied" product. Id. at 6; see
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953) (reiterating the rule that
tying agreements are per se unreasonable when the seller is in a monopolistic position in the
market for the "tied" product and when trade of the "tied" product is substantially restrained).
47. Stanley N. Barnes, Mergers, in CONFERENCE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT 57, 65 (James A. Rahl & Earle Warren Zaidins eds. 1955)
[hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT] (explaining that no cases were filed under § 7 of the Clayton
Act after the 1950 amendment until Schenley, General Shoe, and Hilton Hotel).
The current version of § 7 provides in relevant part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
48. 370 U.S. 294 316-23 (1962) (discussing how the Supreme Court interepreted the amend-
ment by commenting on the deletions and additions that had been made to the amendment).
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eral Motors and DuPont.49 This began a string of litigation victories
in merger cases before the Supreme Court based on increasingly
ephemeral effects on competition,50 where the only principled basis
for decision, according to Justice Potter Stewart, was that the gov-
ernment always won. 51
In the monopolization area, the Supreme Court endorsed the Sec-
ond Circuit's Alcoa decision as early as 19462 and held that a de-
fendant was guilty of monopolization following proof of monopoly
power unless the defendant could demonstrate that the monopoly
power had arisen from historical accident, superior foresight skill or
industry, or otherwise had been thrust upon the defendant. 53 The
Court decided the Griffith case in 1948 with Justice Douglas stating
that monopoly power was an unlawful evil, whether exercised or
not. 4 By 1954, the Court merely affirmed per curiam Judge
Wyzanski's decision which expansively applied Section 2 to impose
liability in the United Shoe litigation.55 Perhaps the only monopoli-
zation case of any comfort to defendants was the Dupont56 cello-
phane case which added more stringent limits to the definition of
relevant markets5" and became the only antitrust battleground in
49. United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 318 (1961) (invalidating
DuPont's acquisition of 23% of General Motors' stock).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of Am. (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294.
51. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The sole consistency that I can
find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always wins.").
52. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 786, 811-15 (1946) (directing case
to the appellate court after being certified by the Supreme Court), endorsing, United States v.
Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
53. American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 813 (citing Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 429).
54. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) ("So it is that monopoly power,
whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under
§ 2 even though it remains unexercised.").
55. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.Mass. 1953), affid per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). United was a company that made and leased machinery that made
shoes. Id. at 339. The court found that its leasing procedure created barriers to the entry of
competitors into the shoe machinery field. Id. at 340. First, the procedures kept machine renters
from disposing of a United machine to get another. Id. Second, United offered more favorable
replacement terms when lessees were ready to switch machines. Id. Third, United offered repair
services which prevented a separate repair industry from evolving. Id. The court thus found that
the leasing procedures maintained the monopolization of the market in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 341.
56. United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
57. In determining whether the defendant had monopoly power, the court looked beyond the
market for cellophane alone. Id. at 394-404. The court held that it was necessary to look at the
market "composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which
[Vol. 44:12511258
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which a powerful or seemingly dominant firm could win. Otherwise,
liability was nearly automatic once power within a relevant market
was established.
The leading antitrust commentators of the 1950's were largely ac-
cepting of the existing overall legal landscape. For example, in 1955,
the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, which was composed of leading antitrust practitioners, gov-
ernment officials, and academics issued its report. 51' Rather than
take on the wholesale reform of antitrust, the Committee saw its
task as setting out "as clearly as possible the path antitrust has trav-
eled and what it augurs for the future."8 9 The Report's discussion of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is almost entirely descriptive, except
for mild criticism of the development of the intra-enterprise conspir-
acy doctrine.60 This section of the Report focuses on the per se
treatment of price fixing and how to fit various types of cases and
practices within that category.6 The Report is very accepting of the
nearly total presumption of illegality in cases under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act upon proof of monopoly power and suggests only the
mildest reformulation of Alcoa as not requiring total lethargy on the
part of a proven monopolist.62
The acceptance of the vast majority of the antitrust status quo
and the mild tone of the Committee's few recommendations contin-
ues throughout most of the Report including its analysis of the ad-
ministration and enforcement of the antitrust laws. 63 This is not to
say that the Report or mainstream antitrust doctrine did not have
they are produced." Id. at 404.
58. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS (Mar. 31, 1955) [hereinafter 1955 REPORT].
59. Id. at 4. The co-chairman at a subsequent conference specifically denied that the Commit-
tee "had plans for a complete overhauling of the antitrust laws." S. Chesterfield Oppenheim,
Remarks on the Report of the Committee, in CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 47, at 9, 11.
Similarly, a member of the committee criticized dissenting members and commentators for as-
suming that the Committee's purpose was to rewrite the antitrust laws. Edward R. Johnston,
Appraisal of the Report and its Major Recommendations, in CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
47, at 15.
60. George E. Hale, The Sherman Act: Sections I and 2, in CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
47, at 33-36 (discussing disagreement among the committee as to whether an intra-enterprise
conspiracy to drive a competitor from the field should be covered under § 2 instead of § 1, since
such conspiracies inevitably involve an attempt to monopolize).
61. 1955 REPORT, supra note 58, at 12-24.
62. Id. at 55-60.
63. Id. at 343-83. The strongest departure from the status quo here was the majority's call for
the elimination of the mandatory treble damage remedy to be replaced by discretion on the part of
the court. Id. at 378-80.
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its critics,64 but merely to suggest the high degree of consensus prev-
alent among the leading antitrust enforcers, practitioners, and schol-
ars recruited for the Attorney General's prestigious Committee and
its influential Report. When there was dissent in the Committee's
report it generally came from members who felt that even more
stringent rules of prohibition and greater enforcement were
appropriate. 65
2. The International Agenda
Brewster also faced a rapidly expanding sea of antitrust liability
in the international area. The antitrust horizon had been perma-
nently altered by the jurisdictional aspects of the Alcoa decision in
1945.66 Alcoa abandoned the need for proof of conduct within the
United States and held that conduct abroad fell within the prescrip-
tive jurisdiction, or subject matter jurisdiction, of United States
under the antitrust laws if it produced certain intended effects
within the United States. 7 Following Alcoa, the assertion of juris-
diction was almost uniformly upheld as the lower courts put less and
less emphasis on the question of intent and required only trivial ef-
fects in the United States to assert jurisdiction over anticompetitive
64. See, e.g., 1955 REPORT, supra note 58, at 390 (dissent of Louis B. Schwartz) (arguing that
the majority report weakens enforcement of anitrust laws by giving broader scope to the "rule of
reason" and cutting back on certain classes of "per se" antitrust violations, and thus it "fails to
adopt necessary measures for strengthening the law so as to create a truly competitive economy in
this county."); Edward R. Johnston, Appraisal of the Report and its Major Recommendations, in
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 47, at 15 (evaluating the committees' findings); Estes Kefauver,
The Attorney General's Committee Report in Perspective, 7 MERCER L. REV. 258 (1956) (claim-
ing that the committee was attempting "massive education" on antitrust law, and in the process,
erred in its interpretation of the laws); Louis B. Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent, I ANTITRUST
BULL. 37 (1955) (claiming that the majority committee report weakened antitrust laws and
adopted no measures to strengthen the law or forward antitrust goals); Milton Handler, An Ex-
amination of the Chapter on Patent Antitrust Problems in the Attorney General's Committee
Report, I ANTITRUST BULL. 156 (1955); Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Anti-
trust Law - A Symposium, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 145 (1955) (publishing a collection of articles to
clarify the Report); Kenneth S. Carlston, Basic Antitrust Concepts, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1033
(1955) (commenting on Chapter 1 of the report); Symposium, Antitrust Law, 24 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1955) (presenting commentary on various aspects of the report including patent antitrust
problems, enforcement of antitrust laws, and antitrust application to banking); Antitrust Adminis-
tration and the Attorney General's Committee Report - A Brief Symposium, 50 Nw. U. L. REV.
305 (1955) (presenting commentary on the recommendations made in Chapter VII of the Report,
which deals with the administration and enforcements of antitrust laws).
65. 1955 REPORT, supra note 58, at 390 (dissent of Louis B. Schwartz).
66. 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
67. Id.
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conduct anywhere in the world.68 The more controversial assertions
of jurisdiction in the lower courts included many international cartel
cases and often included a variety of restraints involving intellectual
property6 0 such as key cartel cases involving the international activi-
ties of Imperial Chemicals,7 0 General Electric, 71 National Lead,2
and Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing.7
The United States Supreme Court's 1951 decision in Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States7" probably was the most high
profile and controversial of this line of decisions. In Timken, the
Supreme Court upheld antitrust liability against an agreement be-
tween a United States bearings manufacturer and a major British
rival jointly to control partially affiliated British and French manu-
facturing entities by allocating territories and fixing pricing through
a trademark licensing agreement and other devices.7 5 The Court re-
jected arguments that the collusive arrangement was necessary be-
cause of the special characteristics of international business. 6 While
Timken can be read for the uncontroversial proposition that interna-
tional cartels cannot be implemented through sham licensing ar-
68. After Alcoa, 249 cases were filed through May 1973 involving foreign trade, and none were
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S.
ANTITRUST LAW § 5.03 n.12 (1995); see generally id. § 5.03 (explaining that the courts inter-
preted Alcoa expansively) see also Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf Western Indus., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (requiring only more than de minimus effect for subject matter
jurisdiction).
69. See e.g. United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953) modified, 105
F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), modified, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. Minnesota Min-
ing & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F.
Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),
ajfd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
70. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. at 511 (finding jurisdiction over a New York corpora-
tion owned by an English corporation when its New York offices and staff were used solely to
carry out the business of the English corporation).
71. United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 82 F.Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) (finding an antitrust violation where the only
full-line lamp manufacturer in the United States required unlicensed manufacturors to waive their
right to sue).
72. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. at 513 (exercising jurisdiction and finding antitrust viola-
tion for dividing world into trade territories for sale of titanium compounds).
73. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.Mass. 1950) (holding
that defendants' creation of joint factories abroad was in restraint of foreign trade when the de-
fendants controlled four-fifths of export trade of the product).
74. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
75. Id. at 595-99.
76. Id. at 599.
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rangements or by merely calling something a joint venture," it was
read at the time as potentially much broader. Noted commentators
including the 1955 Attorney General's Committee Report felt com-
pelled to state that Timken did not make all licensing restraints per
se unreasonable, that all joint ventures were not per se unreasona-
ble, and that foreign investment through subsidiaries was not an au-
tomatic violation of the Sherman Act. 8
The other principal topics of international antitrust interest in the
late 1950's were more international and comparative in nature. 9
There was still the last gasp of interest in the development of a true
international antitrust code. Interest had waned in the wake of the
failed Havana Charter and its restrictive business practices provi-
sions for the never ratified International Trade Organization (here-
inafter ITO). 0 In the 1950s, the Economic and Social Council of
the United States unsuccessfully attempted to revive the ITO's
agenda in the area of restrictive business practices."1 The increasing
tensions of the Cold War between the developed market economies
of the West and the centrally planned economies of the Soviet
Union and its dependents made international progress on this issue
impossible and interfered with subsequent efforts in the United Na-
tions as well.82
At the same time, interest in comparative and foreign antitrust
was increasing exponentially. Japan and Germany had been forced
to adopt new competition statutes as a condition of surrender at the
end of World War 11.83 Other industrialized western nations
77. Id. at 597.
78. 1955 REPORT, supra note 58, at 78, 87-88 (noting that Timken did not "cast any cload
upon restrictions in trade-mark licenses as such").
79. See generally Sol M. Linowitz, International Businessman Meets the Anti-trust Laws, 41
CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1956) (discussing the implications of anti-trust laws on international busi-
ness); Eugene D. Bennett, Comparison of United States and Foreign Antitrust Laws, 6 UCLA L.
REV. 560 (1958) (discussing the basic similarities and differences of United States and foreign
antitrust laws).
80. Article 46, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.
2/78 (Mar. 24, 1948), reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Pub. No. 326, Commercial Law
Studies 114 (1948).
81. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices to the Economic and
Social Council, U.N. ESCOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. E/2380 (1953).
82. See Debra L. Miller & Joel Davidow, Antitrust at the U.N.: A Tale of Two Codes, 18
STAN. J. INT'L L. 347 (1982) (discussing the difficulties encountered by the United Nations in
negotiations over a restrictive business practice code and the transfer of technology); see also Joel
Davidow, International Antitrust Codes: The Post-Acceptance Phase, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 567,
568-89 (1981) (discussing the endorsement of the United Nations resolution).
83. For a discussion of competition law and policy in Germany both before and after World
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adopted or expressed interest in adopting competition statutes, often
using the United States as a model.84 The competition rules of the
European Coal and Steel Community85 and the new competition
rules of the broader European Economic Community"6 were of con-
siderable interest to American business actively seeking to export,
license, or invest in a rebuilt Western Europe. 7
D. The Innovation of Antitrust and American Business Abroad
Brewster was not the only member of the first generation of inter-
national antitrust scholars. Professor James Rahl of Northwestern
University Law School and Professor Eugene Rostow of Yale Uni-
versity Law School are other prominent examples."8 Leading gov-
War II, see JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1986); David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: Ger-
man Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25 (1994)
(discussing the evolution of competition law in Germany); Ivo E. Schwartz, Antitrust Legislation
and Policy in Germany - A Comparative Study, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 617 (1957) (discussing the
replacement of Allied decartecization laws with Germany's own law against restraints on compei-
tion in the 1950s).
For a similar discussion regarding Japan, see MITsUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND COMPETITION LAW (1993); Alex Y. Seita & Jiro Tamura, The Historical Background of
Japan's Antimonopoly Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 115.
84. See Miller & Davidow, supra note 82, at 854 (discussing the global development of laws
against restraint of trade).
85. Treaty Instituting The European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 4 1951, Art. 65-66, 261
U.N.T.S. 140, 195-204. The goal of the treaty was to establish conditions which would assure the
most rational distribution while maintaining the highest possible level of productivity. Id. at 145.
Article 65 lays out competition rules which forbade production, technical development, or in-
vestments, and allocating products, customers, or sources of supply. Id. at 195.
Article 66 establishes the High Authority's [governing branch of the European Coal and Steel
Community] power to authorize exemptions to treaty guidelines in certain circumstances and sets
out the rules for the imposition of fines when treaty violations occur. Id. at 199-204.
86. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, entered in force, Jan. 1, 1958,
Art. 85-90, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-50. The treaty's goal was to promote development, expansion,
stability, and to raise the standard of living in the European Community. Id. at 15. Articles 85-90
set out the common rules that goverened the competition of enterprises under the treaty. Id. at 47-
50. The rules prohibit against anticompetitive agreements and abuses of a dominant position by
both public and private undertakings. Id. at 48.
87. See. e.g., Eugene D. Bennett, Comparison of United States and Foreign Antitrust Laws, 6
UCLA L. Rev. 560 (1959); Richard M. Buxbaum, Antitrust Regulation Within the European
Economic Community, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 402 (1961); Friedmann, Foreign Investment and Re-
strictive Trade Practices, 1960 J. Bus. L. 144; Ernest Goldstein, Effect of Foreign Antitrust Laws
on United States Business, 3 Antitrust Bull. 679 (1958); Pricing, Antitrust, European Common
Market and Other Problems in Foreign Licensing-Research Project Interim Report, PTC J. Res.
& Ed. 23 (1959) (Conf. No.).
88. See JAMES A. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CON-
FLICT (J. Rahl ed. 1970); EUGENE V. ROSTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM: T14E PUBLIC LAW OF
AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1959).
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ernment officials and private practitioners working and writing in
the field of international and comparative antitrust during this era
included Sigmund Timberg, 89 Wilbur Fugate, o" and Gilbert Monta-
gue. 1 Many of these individuals also served on the 1955 Attorney
General's Committee.92
Brewster's focus and interests were different from his contempo-
raries and most of the scholars and commentators which have fol-
lowed him. Professor Rahl chose to emphasize the developing com-
petition law of the European Community, especially following the
creation of an effective enforcement mechanism in 1963 empower-
ing the European Commission to investigate and punish violations.9
Wilbur Fugate in his treatise, as it continues to evolve to this day,
has emphasized a more historical approach to the development of
United States antitrust law and policy in the foreign commerce
area.
9 4
While the 1955 Attorney General's Committee Report devoted
considerable attention to antitrust problems involving foreign com-
89. FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION OF N.Y., N.J. AND CONN., TRADE REGULATIONS SYMPOSIUM:
MONOPOLIES, MERGERS, AND MARKETS - A NEW FOCUS (Sigmund Timberg & Malcolm A.
Hoffman eds., 1955).
90. WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (4th ed. 1991).
91. GILBERT H. MONTAGUE, TRUSTS OF TODAY: FACTS RELATING TO THEIR PROMOTION, Fi-
NANCIAL MANAGEMENT, AND THE ATTEMPT OF STATE CONTROL (1904).
92. See 1955 REPORT, supra note 58, at vii (listing Gilbert H. Montague, James A. Rahl, and
Eugene V. Rostow as members of the committee).
93. See JAMES A. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVERLAP AND CON-
FLICT (J. Rahl ed. 1970). The book was sponsored by the European Common Market Antitrust
Project and its goal was to satisfy the need for "a definition of the sources, types and seriousness
of international antitrust conflict, with the United States and the Common Market [of Europe] as
specific objects of study." Id. at xi. The majority of the book concentrates on European and Amer-
ican antitrust history and policy while the remainder of the book discusses general international
approaches to antitrust. Id.; see also BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (2d ed. 1993). Hawk's book is divided into
two parts. Id. at vi. Part one discusses the application of U.S. antitrust in the interantional arena.
Id. Part Two is an analysis of the Competition rules of the EEC (European Economic Commu-
nity). Id. Hawk focussed on the EEC "because of the importance to international trade of the
member states comprising the Common Market and as an example of a highly developed foreign
system of competition rules and enforcement." Id.
In keeping with these interests, Professor Rahl served in the early 1960s as probably the first
American resident law firm partner working in Brussels and Professor Hawk, until quite recently,
has served as a resident partner in the Brussel's office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.
94. See, e.g., WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (4th ed.
1991). Mr. Fugate continues his work in this field and is also a contributor to an ABA monograph
on special defenses in international antitrust litigation. The first edition of Fugate's book appeared
in 1958, the same year as Antitrust and American Business Abroad and often was reviewed to-
gether with Brewster's book. See infra note 113 (citing to reviews by Weston, Packer and
Metzger).
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merce and moved well beyond the description and acceptance of the
status quo found in much of the rest of the report, it expressly es-
chewed the very topic Brewster found most interesting; namely,
whether antitrust helped or hindered the foreign commerce of the
United States and the related foreign policies of the United States
government.95
Brewster's project also differed from much of the contemporary
writing in terms of the origins of Antitrust and American Business
Abroad and its methodology. His book was neither solely a theoreti-
cal academic inquiry nor merely a practice-oriented analysis of past
decisions. Antitrust and American Business Abroad grew out of a
study for the Special Committee on Antitrust and Foreign Trade of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York- and received
funding from the Merrill Foundation for the Advancement of Fi-
nancial Knowledge.96 In addition to traditional legal research and
analysis, Brewster conducted interviews with businessmen and attor-
neys who had experience with international business transactions
and their related antitrust problems.91 These interviews, as well as
Brewster's own insights, formed the combination of pragmatism and
theory which made Antitrust and American Business Abroad so ap-
pealing to practitioners, policy makers, and scholars.98
Antitrust and American Business Abroad was divided into three
parts. The first part analyzed the fundamental problems, policies,
and conflicts between antitrust and foreign policy.99 The second part
analyzed the impact of United States antitrust law and policy on
specific types of transactions such as exporting, the licensing of
technology, and investment in foreign markets.1"'
Part three contained Brewster's overall conclusions and recom-
mendations for change, so as not to discard United States antitrust
95. See 1955 REPORT, supra note 58, at 66 ("[Tlhis Committee has made no independent
factual study to provide any basis for determining whether our antitrust laws have helped or
hindered the foreign commerce of the United States .... .
96. See BREWSTER, supra note 1, at v.
97. Id. at vii.
98. The work also included three appendices growing out of the City Bar's study. The first
appendix, prepared by the late Professor Donald Trautman of the Harvard Law School, was enti-
tled "A Study of the International Environment: The International Reach of American regulatory
legislation Other Than the Sherman Act." Id. at 309. Stuart L. Pittman prepared an appendix on
"The Foreign Aid Programs and the United States Government's Antitrust Policy." Id. at 459.
David Gill prepared the final appendix on "Problems of Foreign Discovery." Id. at 474.
99. Id. at xiii-xv.
100. Id. at xv-xxi.
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law in the international arena, but to better align antitrust princi-
ples with the broader national interest. 10 1 His recommendations con-
cerned both the process of bringing and resolving claims and the
substance of the rules to be applied.
First, he suggested that "[a]ny complaint or proposed proceeding
involving foreign conduct, rights, properties, or parties should be of-
fered for the consideration and comment of the Department of State
before it is filed" 102 and that the State Department should further
be consulted in connection with any "proposed relief governing for-
eign parties or properties or rights . . . .,,o0 More controversially,
he also proposed a procedure that would allow the President to ter-
minate an antitrust proceeding or grant an exemption if the Na-
tional Security Council found it essential to the national security to
do so.1"4
With respect to the assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe, or sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction as it was generally referred to in that era, 05
Brewster recommended the adoption of a jurisdictional rule of rea-
son by which jurisdiction is tested not merely by the presence of
some effect in the United States but through a weighing of such
factors as:
(a) the relative significance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States compared with conduct abroad; (b) the extent to which there
is explicit purpose to harm or affect American consumers or Americans'
business opportunity; (c) the relative seriousness of effects on the United
States as compared with those abroad; (d) the nationality or allegiance of
the parties or in the case of business associations, their corporate location,
and the fairness of applying our law to them; (e) the degree of conflict with
foreign laws and policies; and (f) the extent to which conflict can be avoided
without serious impairment of the interests of the United States or the for-
eign country.'"
Brewster made important recommendations with respect to the
application of United States antitrust law to export conduct as well.
Brewster recommended the abolition of the Webb-Pomerene Act
which granted a narrow exemption to export conduct of registered
101. Id. at xxi-xxiv.
102. Id. at 444.
103. Id. at 445.
104. Id. at 456-58.
105. The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law now discusses the concept of legislative
jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a) (1987).
106. BREWSTER, supra note 1, at 446.
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export associations. 10 Brewster's recommendations in this area were
not intended to expand, but to contract, antitrust liability. Brewster
argued that the exemption had come to be perceived as the sole
means by which joint exporting activity could escape antitrust liabil-
ity and that the narrow interpretation of the exemption by the en-
forcement agencies and the courts and the resulting uncertainty in
the business community had acted to prevent a variety of useful ex-
port activity that created no harmful effects in the United States. 08
He advocated bringing export conduct under the general standards
of the Sherman Act and recommended interpreting the Sherman
Act to bar agreements affecting exports only upon iproof of a sub-
stantial effect on the United States market or a similar effect on
United States export opportunities.'0 9
On the substantive level, Professor Brewster was a staunch oppo-
nent of per se rules in the international arena." 0 Specifically, he
proposed the abolition of the per se rule in analyzing restraints
found in the licensing of intellectual property in international mar-
kets and the creation of legitimate joint ventures between competi-
tors to penetrate foreign markets."' Finally, he was quite critical of
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, especially as it purported to
impose liability on parent-subsidiary dealings in international
markets."'
II. THE LEGACY OF ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD
Antitrust and American Business Abroad was well praised from
the moment it was published. The book was reviewed in the Ameri-
can Bar Association Journal, American Journal of Comparative
107. Id. at 454-56. The Webb-Pomrene Export Trade Act provided the exemption that
"[n]othing contained in the Sherman Act ... shall be construed as declaring to be illegal an
association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade . 15 U.S.C. § 62
(1988).
108. BREWSTER, supra note 1, at 454-55.
109. Id. at 455-56.
110. Id. at 448.
111. Id. Brewster believed instead of per se illegality, legality should depend upon the serious-
ness of the probable economic effect and the apparent purpose behind the act. Id.
112. Id. at 181. Brewster stated that in parent-subsidiary dealings, if foreign expansion "is done
by a branch or division of the American Corporation without separate incorporation, there is no
basis for liability . . . .There is only one legal entity, and it takes at least two to make a conspir-
acy." Id. It should be noted that although Brewster clearly favored the abolition of this doctrine of
liability, he addressed the topic in his chapter on ownership of foreign enterprise and not in the
recommendations section.
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Law, the Journal of Legal Education, and the law reviews of Brook-
lyn Law School, Columbia, George Washington, Georgetown,
Harvard, and the University of Pennsylvania.11 All the reviews
were positive, if not glowing, regardless of whether the reviewer
agreed with Brewster's specific policy recommendations. 14 Antitrust
and American Business Abroad was hailed as "unexcelled," 5 "an
extraordinary work," 116 "a masterpiece of legal writing,"11 7 and "a
masterly balance between the academic appraisal of the problems
under discussion and the consideration given to the needs of the
counsellors of American business." ' 8
Antitrust and American Business Abroad soon became a stan-
dard cite for judges in international antitrust cases. Its original 1958
edition and the second edition as prepared by James Atwood in
1981 have been cited in seventeen cases,1 9 including the most sig-
113. Lloyd N. Cutler, 72 HARV. L. REV, 1588, 1588 (1959) (book review) (labeling Brewster's
book as "extraordinary"); Wolfgang Fikentscher, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 557, 557 (1960) (book re-
view) ("[O]ne of the most interesting books on the influence of American antitrust on interna-
tional business of the last years."); Wolfgang G. Friedmann, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1311, 1311
(1958) (book review) (commenting that Brewster's book is "comprehensive and penetrating");
Robert M. Kaufman, 25 BROOK. L. REV. 367, 367 (1959) (book review) (stating that Brewster
has produced a well-documented scholarly work); Heinrich Kronstein, 11 J. LEGAL ED. 592, 593
(1959) (book review) (noting that the book presents a "masterly balance between the academic
appraisal of the problems under discussion and the consideration given to the needs of the coun-
selor of American business"); Gerald A. Malia, 44 A.B.A. J. 1193, 1193-94 (1958) (book review)
(noting that Brewster provides a current and comprehensive report); Stanley D. Metzger, 47 GEO.
L. J. 611, 613-14 (1959) (book review) (stating that Professor Brester's discussion "presents much
interesting material of recent vintage."); Herbert L. Packer, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 576, 577 (1959)
(book review) (noting that Brewster has produced a "masterpiece of legal writing"); Glen E. Wes-
ton, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613, 614 (1958) (book review) (stating that Brewster's book is "unex-
celled" and should be invaluable to the anti-trust practitioner).
114. See Kaufman, supra note 113 at _. The reviewer disagrees with Brewster's ideological
concepts of antitrust. Id. at 368. The reviewer indicated that Brewster was incorrect to believe
that outdated antitrust concepts present an obstacle for foreign achievement. Id. Furthermore, the
reviewer believed antitrust laws are "an expression of our basic concept of freedom of economic
opportunity" and are the "most important characteristic . . . of the way of life which we es-
pouse." Id. Another reviewer believed Professor Brewster's analysis of United States v. Aluminum
Co. and the theory of extraterritoriality in the international jurisdiction context are inaccurate.
Metzger, supra note 113, at 613.
115. Weston, supra note 113, at 614.
116. Cutler, supra note 113, at 1588.
117. Packer, supra note 113, at 577.
118. Kronstein, supra note 113, at 593.
119. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2910 & n.24 (1993); Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 n.12 (1962); In re Insurance
Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 1991); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 942 n.123 (D.C. Cir. 1984); American Rice, Inc., v. Arkansas Rice Grow-
ers Co-op. Assoc., 701 F.2d 408, 413 n.6 (5th Cir. 1983); Montreal Trading Ltd., v. AMAX Inc.,
661 F.2d 864, 870 (10th Cir. 1981); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636
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nificant and controversial applications of United States antitrust law
to international business.
In addition to serving as a reference and research tool, Antitrust
and American Business Abroad often succeeded in persuading en-
forcement officials, judges, and law makers to move international
antitrust law and policy in line with Brewster's recommendations. 2 0
For example, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission routinely consult with the State Department"2 ' and any
affected foreign nations, 22 and both agencies have committed them-
selves in published guidelines to carefully considering foreign policy
implications before initiating investigations or taking enforcement
actions.' 23 On occasion, foreign policy considerations have led the
F.2d 1300, 1309 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 n.26
(7th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1301 n.8 (3d Cir.
1979) (J. Adams concurring); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 75 n.7 & 78 n.14 (2d Cir.
1977); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 608
n.12 (9th Cir. 1976); Rivendell Forest Prod., Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Prod., Ltd., 810 F. Supp.
1116, 1118 (D.Colo. 1993); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n,
574 F. Supp. 1453, 1462 n.26 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F.
Supp. 896, 903 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 494
F. Supp. 1161, 1189 n.64 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D.Del. 1970); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.P.A., 244 F.
Supp. 70, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
120. See Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (quot-
ing Brewster as stating that "[ainticompetitive practices compelled by foreign nations are not
restraints of commerce, as commerce is understood in the Sherman Act, because refusal to comply
would put an end to commerce"). The court further stated that American business abroad does
not carry with it the freedom and protection of competition it enjoys here, and our courts cannot
impose them. Id.
121. Informal consultation with State Department appears to have predated the publication of
Antitrust and American Business Abroad by some years. See 1955 REPORT, supra note 58, at 97-
98.
122. In many cases the United States is obligated to inform and consult with a foreign nation
affected by an antitrust investigation or enforcement action as a result of a bilateral antitrust
cooperation agreement or compliance with multilateral guidelines promulgated by the Organiza-
tion of Economic Cooperation and Development. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, DECLARATION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, O.E.C.D. Press Release A(76)20 (June
21, 1976) reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 969, 974 (1976). It also stated the following:
Enterprises should while conforming to official competition rules and established poli-
cies of the countries in which they operate . . . be ready to consult and co-operate,
including the provision of information, with competant authorities of countries whose
interests are directly affected in regard to competition issues or investigations. Provi-
sion of information should be in accordance with safeguards normally applicable in
this field.
Id.
123. U.S. Dep't of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
for International Operations § 3.2 (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES];
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations § 5 (Nov.
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Department of Justice or the President himself to refrain from tak-
ing action. 2
Brewster's jurisdictional rule of reason became the basis for the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc.12 5 Timberlane and its progeny
revised the Alcoa intended effects test 1 6 to require an additional
balancing of the interests of the United States and concerned for-
eign nations before finding or exercising jurisdiction to prescribe the
conduct under United States antitrust law. 27 The influential Third
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law has adopted a version of
Brewster's test as a requirement of international law that jurisdic-
tion to prescribe must be "reasonable" as measured by a balancing
of many of the familiar factors advocated in Antitrust and Ameri-
can Business Abroad.1 28
11, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES].
124. U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, Nov. 19, 1984 (terminating grand jury investi-
gation of passenger air travel between United States and United Kingdom based on foreign policy
considerations).
125. 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (adopting Brewster's "jurisdictional rule of reason"
which evaluates and balances the relevant considerations in each case).
126. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the Alcoa effects test).
127. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
128. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 105, at §§ 402-03 (noting that the balancing factors
include the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, the connections between
the regulating state and the person responsible for the activity to be regulated, the character of
the activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the international arena, and the
extent to which the regulation effects the regulation of other states).
Even where the jurisdictional rule of reason was not adopted courts and commentators were
forced to confront and address Brewster's ideas. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgium
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 942 & 942 n.123 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Brewster as articulating
"several other well-established principles" which could be utilized by the defendants in a later
proceeding should the facts reveal that the United States laws are not applicable due to foreign
governmental involvement); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980)
(finding the "jurisdictional rule of reason" as set forth in Timberlane consistent with the Court's
current pronouncement due to the fact that a district judge had already determined jurisdiction in
the case). The ad hoc balancing approach called for by the jurisdictional rule of reason engen-
dered a huge debate in the academic literature which continues to this day. The various criticisms
of comity as a test for jurisdiction are compiled and summarized in WALLER, supra note 68,
§ 5.11.
One of the most significant critics of the jurisdictional rule of reason as a rule of law has been
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in the more recent International
Enforcement Guidelines. While pledging to carefully consider comity in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, the enforcement agencies have contended that a governmental decision to
bring an enforcement action is a definitive and binding determination that overall United States
interests outweigh those of any affected foreign nations. The Guidelines then contend that the
judiciary may not second guess or review this decision by the Executive Branch. See 1995 INTER-
NATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 3.2; 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 123,
§ 5 n.167. The 1995 Guidelines do not take any position on whether a comity analysis should or
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A federal district court in Delaware also paid Brewster the high-
est compliment possible to a treatise writer by adopting his ideas to
change the law. In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc.,129 the court utilized the foreign sovereign compul-
sion for the first, and so far only, time to excuse a defendant's an-
ticompetitive conduct on the basis that it had been compelled by a
foreign government acting in its sovereign capacity. 130 In formulat-
ing an absolute defense for such compulsion, the court relied on An-
titrust and American Business Abroad stating:
In his book, Antitrust and American Business Abroad, Professor (now Pres-
ident) Kingman Brewster states a proposition which should be self-evident.
Anticompetitive practices compelled by foreign nations are not restraints of
commerce, as commerce is understood in the Sherman Act, because refusal
to comply would put an end to commerce. American business abroad does
not carry with it the freedom and protection of competition it enjoys here,
and our courts cannot impose them. Commerce may exist at the will of the
government, and to impose liability for obedience to that will would elimi-
nate for many companies the ability to transact business in foreign lands.
Were compulsion not a defense, American firms abroad faced with a gov-
ernment order would have to choose one country or the other in which to do
business. The Sherman Act does not go so far. 1'
Even when not explicitly cited, many of Brewster's recommenda-
tions have entered black letter law. The Supreme Court, in 1984,
eliminated the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine for joint action
between a parent corporation and its unincorporated divisions or
wholly-owned subsidiaries in the Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp. decision 82 and paved the way for the lower courts to
eliminate the doctrine in most situations where the parent corpora-
tion has effective control of its subsidiaries.' The judicial and De-
partment of Justice attitudes towards vertical restrictions and the
licensing of intellectual property has moved as far away from per se
rules as possible,3' except where the licensing transaction is a sham
must be undertaken in private antitrust litigation, other than to observe that many courts are
willing to undertake such an analysis. 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 3.2.
129. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.Del. 1970).
130. Id. at 1298.
131. Id.
132. 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding that a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are
incapable of conspiring with each other for the purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act).
133. See WALLER, supra note 68, § 1.10 n.15 (listing lower courts which did not find a viola-
tion where there "is effective common control among corporation affiliates").
134. For cases reflecting judicial attitude moving away from per se rules, see WALLER, supra
note 68, § 9.
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for outright collusion between competitors. 85 A similar evolution
has taken place in the analysis of joint ventures as well." 6
Brewster's ideas also have influenced the course of legislative de-
velopments. In the later 1970s and early 1980s Congress held exten-
sive hearings on whether the antitrust laws were responsible for an
increasing United States trade deficit and a perception that export
performance was declining.1 7 In 1982, Congress did not amend or
abolish the Webb-Pomerene Act,' but instead enacted two new
statutes to reduce uncertainty over the antitrust consequences of ex-
porting and to encourage innovative forms of joint exporting. First,
Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
which specified that anticompetitive restraints involving exports will
be subject to United States antitrust law only if they produce direct,
substantial, and foreseeable effects in the United States market or
on the export opportunities of a United States entity. 9 Second,
Congress enacted the Export Trading Company Act which allows
exporters or groups of exporters to receive advance certification that
their conduct will not violate the antitrust laws, binding immunity
from challenge by the Antitrust Division, and valuable procedural
and substantive protections if the arrangement is challenged by a
private plaintiff. 40
In 1984 and 1993, Congress similarly passed new legislation to
encourage joint ventures. Both the National Cooperative Research
Act' and the later National Cooperative Production Amendments
of 199312 specify that the full rule of reason is the standard to be
135. U.S. Dep't of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licens-
ing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property, § 3.4 (Apr. 6, 1995) (licensing arrangements pre-
sumed to create significant integrative efficiencies which warrant analysis under the rule of reason
unless the putative integration itself is a sham); 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note
123, at _.
136. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (vertical blanket licenses of
copyrighted material granted by an association of composers to broadcast media held not to be per
se illegal price-fixing under the Sherman Act where the effect and the purpose of the practice
have significant procompetitive potential); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (com-
menting that all joint ventures are not unreasonable).
137. See generally BERNARD D. REAMS & MARY ANN NELSON, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT OF 1982 (1989).
138. For the text of the Webb-Pomerene Act, see supra note 107.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 6A (1988). The manner in which the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission will apply the FTAIA is discussed in the 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES,
supra note 123, § 3.13-.133.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 4001-21 (1982).
141. Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984).
142. Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993).
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applied in judging the legality of covered joint ventures and provides
a registration procedure whereby firms would be subject only to sin-
gle damages if their joint venture is subsequently challenged in a
suit for damages.143 In all of these judicial and legislative develop-
ments there are explicit references or echoes of the ideas and recom-
mendations in Antitrust and American Business Abroad.
III. TODAY'S ISSUES FOR ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD
The year 1958 was a long time ago. The world in which interna-
tional business is conducted has changed dramatically. Even since
1988, the year of Kingman Brewster's passing, the world has
changed in ways that have surprised everyone. The United States
foreign policy is still adjusting to the cataclysmic changes and op-
portunities brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
struggles of many countries that are seeking to make; the transition
to a more democratic and market-oriented economy. "' United
States international trade and economic policy has evolved and, in
many instances, has become indistinguishable from foreign and na-
tional security policy in responding to trade and competitiveness is-
sues in international organizations,'" multilateral or bilateral nego-
tiations,1 46 unfair trade disputes,'14 7 and in continuing to consider the
role of antitrust law and competition policy in promoting the inter-
ests of the United States and the global trading system." 8
Since the mid-1970s, antitrust itself has changed in response to a
changing underlying political and economic consensus. Per se rules
143. Pub. L. No. 98-462 §§ 3-4, 98 Stat 1816-1817 (1984), and Pub. L. No. 103-42 §2(b), 107
Stat 117 (1993).
144. See Kathleen E. McDermott, U.S. Agencies Provide Competition Counseling to Eastern
Europe, 6 ANTITRUST 4 passim (1991) (citing various officials' positive responses to the United
States offering antitrust counseling to Eastern Europe).
145. For a detailed evaluation of the interrelationship between foreign policy, national security,
and international trade and competitiveness, see Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterri-
torial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 74-75, (1992) (noting the relationship
between the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat 120 (amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1952), and
the Export Administration Act, 15 C.F.R. §778.2(a) when they address the the transfer of nuclear
weapons or their component parts, technical information, and their impact on trade).
146. International Trade - U.S. Government Policy Issues Affecting U.S. Business Activities
in China, GAO Report, at 29 (1994).
147. Id. at 34.
148. Micheal L. Weiner, The Increasing Internationalization of Antitrust, 8 ANTITRUST 31
(1993).
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virtually have vanished in all areas of vertical restraints.149 Horizon-
tal restraints typically are deemed per se unreasonable only when
the agreement is inevitably anticompetitive. 50 Monopolization and
merger cases require more than just minor number crunching in or-
der for the government or private plaintiff to prevail.15 1 Private
plaintiffs face a variety of hurdles in the form of direct purchaser
requirements,1 5 1 standing issues,15 3 and proof of antitrust injury15 1
before even reaching the merits of their antitrust allegations.
Many of these changes have come since Antitrust and American
Business Abroad was expanded and updated with great skill by
149. For example, in Continental T.V. Inc., the Supreme Court held that vertical non-price
restrictions normally will be judged under a rule of reason standard absent significant proof that
the practice inevitably and unreasonably restricts interbrand competition. Continental T. V. Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). Even tying offenses which remain nominally per se
unreasonable involve proof of most of the requirements of the full rule of reason before per se
liability is invoked. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
Resale price maintenance remains per se unreasonable, but has been virtually defined out of
existence through restrictive formulations of what constitutes resale price maintenance, heightened
standards of proof, and heightened requirements for a private plaintiff to prove antitrust injury.
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (holding no standing for private
plaintiff to challenge most forms of maximum resale price maintenance); Business Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (requiring proof of ongoing agreement regarding price or
price levels following termination of price cutter for per se treatment); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding proof of complaints by competing dealers admissible,
but not sufficient, to show that dealer was terminated pursuant to actionable conspiracy).
150. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
151. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510-11 (1974) (using the availa-
bility of usable resources to predict future ability to compete, the Court found the Government's
estimate of the defendant's market power unrealistic); United States v. DuPont De Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956) (articulating that the primary consideration is "whether defendants
control the price and competition in the market for such part of trade or commerce as they are
charged with monopolizing").
152. Kansas v. Utilicorop United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 207 (1990) (relying on Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. which restricted the definition of "direct purchasers" to only
the "immediate buyers from the alleged antitrust violators" and, thereby preventing the plaintiffs
from bringing a claim).
153. Lovett v. General Motors Corp., 975 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1992) (listing the factors to
determine standing to recover private damages in an antitrust claim as follows:
(1) [t]he causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the harm to
the plaintiff; (2) [i]mproper motive; (3) [w]hether the injury was of a type that Con-
gress sought to redress with the antitrust laws; (4) [t]he directness between the injury
and the market restraint; (5) [t]he speculative nature of the damages; [and] (6) [t]he
risk of duplicate recoveries or complex damage apportionment).
154. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (distinguishing
that a plaintiff may not recover damages simply by showing "injury causally linked to an illegal
presence in the market," but only if he proves the injury was "attributable to an anticompetitive
aspect of the practice under scrutiny").
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James Atwood in 1981."" It is clearly time for another look at the
same issues that Brewster first considered in 1958 and the many
new issues that have arisen since that time. I am very fortunate to
have that opportunity. Although I approach the project of preparing
a third edition of Antitrust and American Business Abroad with
gratitude to both James Atwood and Diane Wood, 156 who made my
participation possible, I also approach it with some trepidation.
The most significant developments have occurred in six main ar-
eas. First, I believe that the events of the past fifteen years have
addressed many of the concerns in Atwood and Brewster regarding
the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law to the
conduct of persons and firms outside our borders.' 57 I believe this
issue has faded in prominence, somewhat, as a result of the rest of
the world acknowledging the legitimacy of some form of extraterri-
toriality and the United States executive branch and many courts
becoming increasingly more sensitive to the need for restraint and
limits in the use of extraterritoriality.' 58
This does mean not that the issue has gone away. Government
enforcement policy is always subject to change. In addition, the
specter of private litigation unconstrained by foreign policy or na-
tional interests remains. There will always be cases and controver-
sies of extremely high profile that will involve the reach of United
States antitrust and the legitimate interests of foreign nations.
For example, the Supreme Court can be criticized for underap-
preciating the virtues of international comity in Hartford Fire In-
surance Co. v. California.59 Hartford Fire is troubling since the
decision can be interpreted to hold that international comity should
never be a consideration unless the foreign interest amounts to out-
155. JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD (2d ed. 1981).
156. Professor Diane Wood taught at the University of Chicago Law School immediately prior
to her service as Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division for Appellate and
International matters. In that position, she was the primary drafter of the 1995 INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES, supra note 123. Diane Wood is now a judge on the United Stales Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. Then Professor Wood prepared the 1993 cumulative supplement to
ATWOOD & BREWSTER supra note 155 and would have prepared the third edition but for her
government service.
157. See supra notes 105-06.
158. For a discussion on the acceptance of the United States position on exterritoriality by
Germany, France, Switzerland, and Japan, see Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterrito-
rial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1, 67 (1992).
159. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
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right compulsion of private actors. 6 ' However, I am not particularly
critical of the result reached in that case because the evidence fairly
strongly suggested that the defendants intended to affect the United
States insurance market and that their conduct in fact produced di-
rect, substantial and foreseeable effects.' 61
On the other hand, the Colorado district court in Rivendell Forest
Products, Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products, Ltd.62 appears overly
enamored of deference to unproven foreign interests. In that case,
the district court dismissed a private treble damage action without
any attempt to conduct discovery or critically examine the nature
and strength of the Canadian governmental interests and the rela-
tive importance of those interests in comparison to those of the
United States." 3
My prediction is that both of these extreme sort of cases will oc-
cur in the future in the nature of occasional brushfires and will be
dealt with pragmatically, more as matters of private self-interest,
rather than as the type of all consuming diplomatic battles of sover-
eignty and international law that has occurred in the past. There is
a broad international acceptance of some form of extraterritorial-
ity,"" but with some limits. If you look at what the world commu-
nity actually does, and not just its rhetoric regarding specific U.S.
antitrust cases, the use or acceptance of some form of extraterritori-
ality can be said to be nearly universal enough to be considered a
rule of customary international law.' 65
As extraterritoriality with limits becomes the norm, there needs to
be an emphasis on increasing the ability of the courts to decide
questions of extraterritoriality, the effects doctrine, and the comity
of nations in a fair and sophisticated manner on the basis of record
evidence rather than mere rhetoric. Counsel and the courts need to
be familiarized with international and comparative legal materials
160. Id. at 2910 (relying on Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §415 cmt.j, the
Court quoted that "'[T]he fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took place will not,
of itself, bar application of the United States antitrust laws' even where the foreign state has a
strong policy to permit or encourage such conduct.")
161. Id. at 2909-10.
162. 810 F. Supp. 1116 (D.Colo. 1993).
163. Id. It was sufficient that the economic matter giving rise to the antitrust complaint was
subject to an ongoing trade dispute between the nations for the court to deny extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act. Id.
164. See WALLER, supra note 68 § 5.
165. See BORN, supra note 158, at 67 (discussing the international acceptance received by the
United States on its exterritoriality position).
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in order to present well-founded arguments about the merits of ju-
risdiction to prescribe in the routine cases that will dominate the
docket, and the controversial ones that will still arise from time to
time.
The Department of Justice needs to play a more constructive role
in this process in two ways. First, the Antitrust Division needs to
change an unfortunate attitude that arose in the mid-1980s that
comity and other special international defenses somehow do not ap-
ply to government antitrust enforcement actions.166 Comity, 167 the
act of state doctrine, 6 8 and foreign sovereign compulsion 16 9 are not
solely the product of the separation of powers under the United
States Constitution and need to be applied rigorously not just as
part of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but in all types of
litigation regardless of the identity of the plaintiff.
The Antitrust Division also needs to participate more frequently
in private antitrust litigation. This was urged by Brewster in
1958,170 repeated by Atwood in 1981,171 and supported by many
other commentators. 72 Participation by the government as amicus
curiae rarely occurs in any kind of private antitrust litigation, ex-
cept when the Supreme Court requests the views of the Solicitor
General on the granting of certiorari or the merits of a case, 73 and
almost never occurs in the district court where it can do the most
good. The Antitrust Division as a whole, and in particular the For-
eign Commerce Section, could play an important role in providing
factual material for the evidentiary record in evaluating the
strengths of foreign and United States interests in such cases with-
out getting involved in the question of antitrust liability which have
166. 1988 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 123, §§ 4-6. The 1995 INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES reach the same conclusion, see supra note 123, § 3.2-3.
167. The doctrine of Comity is a willingness of one soveriegn to grant a privilege to the legisla-
ture, executive, or judicial act of another soverignty out of deference to that soveriegnty. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987).
168. The act of state doctrine precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the valid-
ity of governmental acts committed by recognized foreign soverign within its own territory. See
e.g., W. S. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics Int'l Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
169. The foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine is a defense for actions taken or compelled by a
foreign sovereign within its territory. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
170. See BREWSTER, supra note 1, at 445-46.
171. See ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 155, at 355.
172. See supra note 113 (citing persons who supported Brewster's findings).
173. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW TASK
FORCE ON THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1991).
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yet to be determined. For example, the antitrust cooperation agree-
ments with both Canada and Australia envisions participation upon
request in order to inform the United States court of any consulta-
tions between the two countries germane to the private litigation.17 4
If such participation is routine and the Division is acting as an in-
formational resource for the court, it will go a long way towards
avoiding the polarization and politicization that could take place if
the Antitrust Division takes a position in a particular case favoring
either party. 76 In the rare case where the stakes are so high that
the Antitrust Division simply should remain silent, it should say so.
Otherwise, judges should request the Division's participation and it
should do so on its own. '6 The result will be more informed deci-
sions, less rhetorical excesses, and an increased likelihood that these
disputes will remain as hotly contested private disputes and not as
diplomatic incidents.
Second, I think it is important to lay to rest an issue that I regard
primarily as a red herring - namely whether antitrust law should
apply a different substantive standard to foreign commerce cases.
This issue arose most prominently in Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Timken17 in which he stated:
[Tihe conditions controlling foreign commerce may be relevant here. When
as a matter of cold fact the legal, financial, and governmental policies deny
opportunities for exportation from this country and importation into it, ar-
rangements that afford such opportunities to American enterprise may not
fall under the ban of a fair construction of the Sherman Act because compa-
rable arrangements regarding domestic commerce come within its
174. Memorandum of Understanding as to the Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with
Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, U.S.-Canada, May 8, 1984, § 11, re-
printed in, 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984) (providing for the court in which a private antitrust suit is
pending the substance and the outcome of the consultations under this agreement); Agreement
Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, U.S.-Australia, June 29, 1982, Art. 6, reprinted in,
21 I.L.M. 702 (1982) (allowing one government to request another to participate in a private
antitrust court proceeding where the issue has been subject-matter notification and consultations
under the agreement).
175. It also avoids the situation in the 1980s when participation in private litigation was part of
the Reagan Administration's agenda to change the substance of antitrust doctrine. Stephen F.
Ross, Interview: Professor Eleanor M. Fox, 6 ANTITRUST 8, 11 (1991).
176. Procedurally, the Antitrust Division can participate through 28 U.S.C. § 517, which per-
mits it to file suggestions of interests.
The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the
Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the inter-
ests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a
court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 517 (1988).
177. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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condemnation."0
Brewster adopted many of these themes in arguing that per se rules
for domestic antitrust violations should not be applied indiscrimi-
nately in the foreign commerce area.179 This same idea was echoed
in the 1977 International Antitrust Guidelines of the Antitrust Divi-
sion which stated:
The rule of reason may have a somewhat broader application to interna-
tional transactions where it is found that (1) experience with adverse effects
on competition is much more limited than in domestic markets, or (2) there
are some special justifications not normally found in the domestic market.,"
As we stand in 1995, this issue is no longer a particularly useful
topic for debate. The courts and more recent Antitrust Divisions of
both Republican and Democratic administrations have not endorsed
or implemented the themes of Frankfurter,"8 ' Brewster,"8 2 or the
1977 Guidelines. 8 ' In contrast, the 1988 International Guidelines
and the 1995 International Guidelines are quite explicit that the
Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission think the
substantive rules of antitrust are the same whether they are being
applied in national, international, or world markets.8 It is increas-
ingly more clear that antitrust law will distinguish between foreign
commerce and domestic cases by applying different jurisdictional
rules and a narrow range of special defenses, 8 5 but will apply the
same basic rules of liabilities in examining the merits of the
dispute. 186
I am not at all sure that Brewster would object to this develop-
ment given that the basic rule of antitrust liability for virtually all
areas of the law today is the rule of reason, 87 except for hard-core
178. Id. at 605-06.
179. BREWSTER, supra note 1, at 79-84, 354-56.
180. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIvIsION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 3 (Mar. 1, 1977).
181. Timken, 341 U.S. at 605-06 (Frankfurter J., dissenting).
182. See supra note 179 (noting Brewster's adoption of several of Frankfiurter's themes).
183. See supra note 180 (citing language from the 1977 International Antitrust Guidelines
which echoes Frankfurter's dissent).
184. See 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 2.0 (noting that the same sub-
stantive rules apply to all nationalities after jurisdictional requirements and considerations of in-
ternational comity have been satisfied).
185. See generally ANTITRUST SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MONOGRAPH NO. 20,
SPECIAL DEFENSES IN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION (1995).
186. 1995 INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 123, § 2.0.
187. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (treating all vertical
non-price agreements under the rule of reason); see also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
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horizontal collusion as to price,"' 8 production,' 9 territories, 190 or
customers. 9 Even in the area of horizontal collusion, the debate
over whether the substantive rules should be different is misleading.
Under Socony-Vacuum and its famous footnote 59, horizontal
agreements relating to pricing are per se unreasonable regardless of
the lack of effect or the lack of power of the conspirators.' 92 The
Department of Justice, should it desire to do so, could prosecute any
number of would-be cartelists whose fanciful schemes have no pos-
sibilities of injuring competition. In contrast, the improbable or
powerless foreign conspiracy will be beyond the reach of United
States antitrust law, since it produces no discernable effect in the
United States. A United States court is unlikely to find jurisdiction
absent a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect in the United
States or on United States export opportunities. Thus, the foreign
cartelist effectively is subject to a version of the rule of reason in
order to satisfy a jurisdictional threshold, whereas a domestic con-
spirator in exactly the same situation is subject to the prosecutorial
discretion of the Antitrust Division.
The third main issue I see is the need for a far greater skepticism
about the desirability or the necessity to promote United States ex-
port cartels or tolerate those of other countries. I am far more nega-
tive than either Atwood " or Brewster'9 about the utility or value
of export cartels as a policy tool of the United States or the need to
tolerate the continuation of such practices on the part of other na-
tions. The vast majority of joint export conduct is either substan-
tively legal under the United States antitrust laws 95 or beyond the
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (holding that not all refusals to deal are
per se unreasonable); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (holding
tying not per se unreasonable without proof of defendant's market power).
188. Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
189. In Re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, Inc., 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.) (holding limitations on
output inherently suspect), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 461 (1992).
190. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam).
191. United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1083 (1982).
192. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 255 n.59 (1940) (ruling that "a
conspiracy to fix prices violates § I of the Act though no overt act is shown, though it is not
established that the conspirators had the means available for accomplishment of their objective,
and though the conspiracy embraced but a part of the interstate or foreign commerce in the
commodity").
193. See ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 155, §§ 9, 19.06.
194. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing Brewster's views regarding the
application of antitrust to export conduct).
195. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing changes in United States anti-
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jurisdiction of the United States antitrust laws under the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act.196 The empirical evidence sug-
gests that both the Webb-Pomerene Act19  and the Export Trading
Company Act" 8 have failed to increase U.S. exports, create new
jobs, or provide other significant economic benefits for the United
States. 99 While sensible jurisdictional limits and a willingness to let
other nations protect their own markets are a principled position, to
promote conduct which can include export cartels aimed at other
countries reeks of hypocrisy. It complicates United States enforce-
ment policy both in taking action against such foreign cartels aimed
at the United States market and in cooperating with other jurisdic-
tions who wish to take action against our export associations aimed
at their markets. It further complicates the role of the United States
in the creation or implementation of free trade areas and regional
markets if market access becomes, or is perceived to be, an invita-
tion for mercantilistic behavior by officially approved export cartels
by any of the trading partners. I stand by my past position and that
of most other commentators in favor of the elimination, rather than
the validation, of such practices through multilateral diplomatic
means.
2 00
Fourth, the relationship between the international trade and anti-
trust laws is of great concern to American business abroad. The
dumping laws 20 1 are a particularly egregious example of a set of
trust laws since the 1970s).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 6A (1988); see also supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the
preconditions for anticompetitive restraints to be subject to United States antitrust law).
197. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988).
198. Id. § 4013 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
199. For a discussion of the Webb-Pomerene Act and the Export Trading Company Act's im-
pact on the United States export, employment and economy, see Spencer Weber Waller, The
Failure of the Export Trading Company Act, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 239, 245-54
(1992).
200. See id. at 272 (advocating the abolition of both the Export Trading Company Act and the
Webb-Pomerene Act in order to facilitate "international negotiations regarding the legitimacy and
abolition of export cartels as a tool of international trade"); see also Wernhard Moschel, Interna-
tional Restraints of Competition: A Regulatory Outline, 10 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 76, 83 (1989);
Hawk, The International Application of the Sherman Act in its Second Century, 59 Antitrust
L.J. 161, 166 (1990); Victor, Export Cartels: An Idea Whose Time has Passed, 60 Antitrust L.J.
571 (1991); Ahdar, The Role of Antitrust Policy in the Development of Australian-New Zealand
Free Trade, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. R. Bus. 317, 330-31 (1991).
201. "Dumping is the sale of products in an export market for less than 1he price of the same
goods in the domestic market. At its simplest, dumping is a form of international price discrimina-
tion." WALLER, supra note 68, § 12.02. Foreign producers might engage in dumping in the United
States to eliminate their excess capacity, to dispose of obsolete merchandise, or to compete as a
new entrant in U.S. markets. Id. Dumping laws create remedies for domestic industries injured by
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international trade laws that seek to penalize aggressive, but profita-
ble, pricing strategies that the antitrust laws normally seek to pro-
mote. °2 While American industry can misuse those laws in ways
that violate the antitrust laws, 0 3 far more often United States in-
dustries lawfully utilize the remedies in precisely the way Congress
intended to suppress import competition. 20 " Now the shoe is on the
other foot as a growing segment of United States industry must re-
spond to dumping and other unfair trade proceedings in an increas-
ingly large number of markets of critical importance to United
States prosperity.
These two bodies of law need to be reconciled in order to promote
the competition on the merits that both international trade law and
antitrust law seek to protect. To date, United States law has done a
miserable job of reconciling these principles from an antitrust stand-
point. United States law has responded typically by subordinating
antitrust to protectionist trade goals and increasing the power of the
import relief laws whenever Congress passes new trade
legislation. 0 5
The international level affords a greater hope. The Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter OECD)2 °0
is engaged in a long-term attempt to bring both bodies of law into
greater harmony. Perhaps the new World Trade Organization 07
foreign producers who engage in dumping in the U.S. See, e.g., Antidumping Act of 1916, 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1916) (creating a limited private right of action for treble damages for manufactur-
ers harmed by international price discriminaiton against any person engaging in dumping in the
U.S.); Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1921) (providing for the imposition of addi-
tional duties equal to the margin for dumping against any person engaging in dumping in the
U.S.).
202. See WALLER, supra note 68, § 12.02 (illustrating that dumping may be a natural conse-
quence of healthy competition in the U.S.). The Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that
even below-cost pricing is lawful where there is no reasonable likelihood that the defendant could
ever recoup its losses or effectively exercise monopoly power in the future. See Brooke Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
203. WALLER, supra note 68, § 13.01 (explaining that American industry could misuse trade
laws by filing frivolous trade petitions "to harass and injure foreign competitors," or by threaten-
ing to initiate or settle trade cases in order to be "used as a disguise for collusion in the United
States or world markets").
204. Id.
205. For an example, see the progressive strengthening of the so-called escape clause codified at
19 U.S.C. § 2251 et. seq. which permits U.S. producers and workers to seek protection from even
fairly traded imports.
206. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OBSTACLES TO
TRADE AND COMPETITION (1993).
207. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 13
(1994).
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also will enter this critical debate about the meaning of competition
and the best method to promote, rather than frustrate, that process.
Fifth, certain aspects of the business and government communi-
ties look at antitrust not just as an impediment, but as a potential
ally in the struggle to open new markets to United States goods and
services.208 They look to United States antitrust law and its foreign
counterparts as a way of eliminating collusion and exclusionary con-
duct that prevents United States firms from entering new markets
where negotiations and trade sanctions have been ineffective. 20 9
Most of the impetus for this is the frustration over actual and per-
ceived barriers to the sale of United States goods and services in
Japan.21 ° Much attention needs to be paid to the narrow and limited
role that antitrust can play in this effort and its jurisdictional and
substantive limitations in confronting barriers in foreign markets.211
At the same time, antitrust should not be viewed as a panacea to
international trade problems which are more likely to be the result
of governmental barriers which antitrust is powerless to attack. An-
titrust law also needs to be shielded from pressures to corrupt a
body of law which maintains competitive values into another protec-
tionist weapon to be applied in a discriminatory fashion on the basis
of nationality rather than the harm to competition.
Finally, I believe that the most significant antitrust constraint on
the behavior of American business abroad is no longer United
States antitrust policy at all, but rather the growth of foreign, re-
gional, and developing international competition norms which arise
out of very different cultural settings and impose substantive and
procedural requirements that are often quite different and occasion-
ally in conflict with United States norms.212 The challenge for
American business will be to accommodate its behavior to these new
norms in a way that is consistent with business objectives. The in-
creasing burdens of these additional competition norms will produce
great pressure to harmonize antitrust laws and procedures. More
208. American Bar Ass'n. Section of Int'l Law & Practice, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT
REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AREA (Feb. 1995).
209. Id.
210. For example, Eastman Kodak recently has filed a petition with the United States Trade
Representative pursuant to § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 seeking sanctions against Japan alleg-
ing it has been denied access to the Japanese market as a result of the Japanese government's
systematic toleration of private anticompetitive behavior.
211. See supra note 208.
212. Waller, supra note 68, § 6.09.
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ambitious proposals to create truly international rules and proce-
dures have been and will be produced. The nature of the success or
failure of these efforts strikes me as the core issue for the decades to
come, just as the question of the jurisdictional reach of United
States antitrust law was the burning question in the past.21
My own views are that the goal of substantive harmonization is
neither desirable nor feasible. In a recent article, I have argued that
the United States antitrust laws represent a unique social and legal
vision that cannot be exported to other countries in any recognizable
form.214 Similarly, the competition laws of the European Union and
the other systems with effective competition laws represent their
own unique vision which cannot be sold, transferred, or used as the
basis of a universal competition law.215 What seems likely to emerge
from even the most good faith attempt at drafting an international
antitrust code is either an unsuccessful and quixotic search for a
detailed set of rules acceptable to the international community or a
type of lowest common denominator approach of vague platitudes
that will not advance the cause of competition law in the world
community.
As an alternative, I would suggest two different types of harmoni-
zation - a harmonization of values and a harmonization of proce-
dures. Where consensus exists as to the value of a system of compe-
tition enforced by law, then countries should be encouraged and
supported to implement competition rules that are consistent with
the shared norms and with national traditions and existing legal in-
stitutions. A single inflexible set of rules as to substantive competi-
tion law is not needed as long as the fundamental norms are fur-
thered rather than subverted.
The shared norms most likely to emerge are a consensus against
cartels both at home and for exports and a most favored nation and
national treatment standard for enforcement decisions. This type of
harmonization is both desirable and feasible and harnesses each
country's own self interest as a tool for progress, rather than begin-
ning a long and contentious negotiation process in order to create a
single legal code which will favor some countries and impose bur-
dens on others. The OECD is one forum where such discussions al-
213. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text (discussing early jurisdictional issues).
214. Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Les-
sons from Antitrust, 42 KAN. L. REV. 557 (1994).
215. Id.
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ready have taken place and will continue to do so. 216 I would urge
also that the World Trade Organization consider this role for itself
in the competition and trade area, rather than conceive its role as
requiring the creation of a new international code of conduct for
restrictive business practices. 17
Much work can also be done in the area of procedural coopera-
tion. American business will benefit from a reduction in the differing
and burdensome compliance requirements of multiple national com-
petition laws. This benefit is most apparent in the merger area
where a major transnational merger or acquisition can involve pre-
merger notifications, either mandatory or voluntary, in more than a
dozen legal systems, each with different deadlines, informational re-
quirements, waiting periods, and procedures for second requests, all
separate from the substantive standards of review for the transac-
tion itself.218 This burden can be reduced without seeking to rewrite
the substance of the rest of the world's merger laws.
The ability of governments to investigate all types of potential an-
ticompetitive conduct can be increased to the benefit of both con-
sumers and businesses through the continuation and expansion of
bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements between enforce-
219ment agencies. In the area of collusion, monopolization, and
mergers and acquisitions, competition enforcers confront the loca-
tion of evidence beyond their national borders.2 20 The trend toward
cooperating in defined circumstances where there are shared values
and norms about competition matters, even where the investigation
concerns matters not illegal in the country containing the evidence,
is one of the most encouraging trends in international competition
law.221
216. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Council Meeting at Ministerial
Level: Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, O.E.C.D. Press
Release A(76)20 (June 21, 1976) reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 969 (1976).
217. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism:
The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393, 427 (1994)
(advocating that the International Antitrust Authority should "serve as a forum for [the] consul-
tation, discussion, and exchange of information").
218. See J. ROWLEY & D. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS
(1991).
219. See, e.g., supra note 174.
220. In this regard see the newly enacted International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
of 1994 which will permit the United States to enter into comprehensive cooperation agreements
with foreign countries permitting the sharing of a wide range of confidential information. H.R.
4781, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1994).
221. Waller, supra note 214.
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Contacts between national enforcement agencies need to evolve
beyond the conflict avoidance of the 1980s into true cooperation.222
In this regard, the passage of the International Antitrust Enforce-
ment Assistance Act of 1994"' is most encouraging. The ultimate
success of this endeavor will depend on the language and usefulness
of the bilateral cooperation agreements between the Antitrust Divi-
sion, the Federal Trade Commission, and their foreign counter-
parts. 24 If concerns about the confidentiality of trade secrets and
other commercially sensitive information can be addressed, 225 na-
tional antitrust enforcement will be more efficient. The cost of inves-
tigations will be reduced both to enforcers, targets, victims, and
third parties and the likelihood of better decisions on the merits will
be increased. This endeavor may not be a total blessing to the hard
core violators of competition norms, but it would represent a victory
for the vast bulk of American firms which vigorously compete and
benefit from a competitive marketplace in which to do business,
both at home and abroad.
III. CONCLUSION
Over the past two years, I have had the pleasure to study and
reconsider the views expressed in Antitrust and American Business
Abroad and its second edition and test them against the subsequent
developments and my personal views. Both have changed somewhat.
More importantly, I hope I am able to address today's issues in anti-
trust in the same manner that Kingman Brewster spoke to the im-
portant concerns of his era. Brewster addressed issues of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction2 26 and the seemingly inevitable growth of per se
rules21 because those were the burning issues of his day. Those is-
222. E.g., Priorities of Canadian Competition Bureau Include Review of Understanding with
U.S., 67 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 416 (1994) (explaining that cooperation be-
tween Canada and the U.S. has "led to convictions in both [countries] in the facsimile paper case,
which marks the first time a joint investigation has produced convictions"). The United States and
Canada also cooperated in the investigation and prosecution of price fixing in the plastic dinner-
ware industry.
223. See Pub. L. No. 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597 (Nov. 2, 1994).
224, No formal negotiations have begun as of July 1, 1995.
225. The Act requires that the foreign nation provide protection to confidential information
equivalent to that provided by the U.S. in order to conclude an assistance agreement.
226. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing Brewster's jurisdictional rule
of reason).
227. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing Brewster's opposition to per se
rules).
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sues remain important in the context of the investigation and litiga-
tion of particular disputes, but are now the province of antitrust spe-
cialists and are no longer the overarching policy questions of the
day.
The hot button issues today relate more to the relationship of the
competition rules in the United States and the competition related
laws of our trading partners and the continuing conflict between
competition and international trade remedies. The issues to be re-
solved include the extent to which the substance and the procedure
of these laws can be coordinated, harmonized, and unified and
whose interests will be served. In addressing these issues in a third
edition of Antitrust and American Business Abroad, I hope to honor
the most important legacy of Kingman Brewster, in seeking to per-
suade and not merely to describe.

